Jan 31, 1982
Up until the 1930s, the American bourgeoisie was unwilling to concede the right to the unskilled workers to form industrial unions. In fact, the American bourgeoisie had been slow to grant rights to any workers, combining the use of judicial injunctions with a high level of legal and extralegal violence to prevent all attempts at organization.
It was not until the strike movement of 1884-86 for the 8-hour day that the American bourgeoisie first really accepted trade unions for the skilled workers. But during the very years when the bourgeoisie was coming to terms with the AF of L, it was smashing several attempts of the unskilled workers to organize. The most important among these were the Knights of Labor, the American Railway Union, and the IWW.
Representatives of the bourgeoisie openly proclaimed their unwillingness to change this position. For example, in 1901, the chairman of the U.S. Steel trust, Judge Gary, said, “We are unalterably opposed to any extension of union labor.” In a 1921 meeting, 22 state manufacturers’ associations pledged not to enter any agreement with a labor union. And in that same year, the United States Attorney General, Harry Daugherty, expressed the government’s backing of this attitude: “So long, and to the extent that I can speak for the Government of the United States, I will use the power of the government within my control to prevent the labor unions of this country from destroying the open shop.”
This was the historic position of the American bourgeoisie.
And yet within a few short years, by the mid 1930s, the bourgeoisie was changing its position, making an almost 180 degree turn. It accepted what it had never accepted before, industrial unions and the organization of the unskilled. Moreover, it eventually gave the new unions a place in bourgeois society, and even a certain encouragement.
What was the reason for and the significance of this change?
Despite its court injunctions, police, National Guard and army, the bourgeoisie in the 1930s found itself face to face with a powerful mobilization of the working class. This movement began in the depths of the depression when unemployment had reached its worst level.
The year 1932 saw two important demonstrations, marking the desperation of the unemployed, one at Ford’s River Rouge complex near Detroit, the other at the White House. Both were beaten back violently, but they left their imprint on the unemployed who began to
create organizations, and who were mobilizing to stop evictions and to demand food and relief.
In 1933, more than one million workers went on strike. The most important of these were in auto. Despite the fact that the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 and Section 7A of the NRA of 1933 both had supposedly given workers the right to organize, these strikes were bitterly opposed by most of the bourgeoisie. Isolated as each individual strike was, the workers were defeated. But the workers’ mobilization did not end. Strikes followed on strikes, and they began to generate support and solidarity from the workers not directly implicated in the fight. In the most important strikes of 1934 in Toledo, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, other sections of the working population and the unemployed actively mobilized to support the strikers. In the winter of 1936, the rubber workers in Akron initiated the wave of sit-downs, wherein workers occupied the property of the capitalists. These sit-downs began to spread to other industries. The most important sit-downs, in Flint and Detroit, mobilized massive support throughout the Midwest, and shook the auto industry, not to mention part of the steel industry which hurried to negotiate before its mills were occupied. It was the turning point of the struggle for industrial unions. From the end of 1935 to the end of 1937, the CIO increased from 900,000 to 3,720,000 and the AFL went from 2,600,000 to 3,600,000, with most of this latter increase in the industrial unions also.
The 1930s saw the workers engage in a real social struggle against the bourgeoisie. In this struggle the workers created organizations appropriate to their struggle, whether it was the flying squadron of pickets to defend their strikes, or the Women’s Emergency Brigade in Flint, both of which became the workers’ answer to the bourgeoisie’s national guard, private goons, and police; whether it was the factory committees which organized the daily life in the factory among the workers who occupied them; whether it was the organizations that the unemployed founded to protect themselves against evictions and to demand relief.
Given this movement, the bourgeoisie and its political representatives were faced with a choice. They could continue to try to crush the workers’ movement. And certainly, at least in the early years of the struggle, this was the choice made by most of the capitalists, even if a few politicians already were proposing a different policy. According to the American Civil Liberties Union, in the last 6 months of 1933, “More than 15 strikers have been killed, 200 injured, and hundreds arrested since July 1. More than 40 injunctions of sweeping character have been issued ... Troops have been called out in a half a dozen strike districts. Criminal syndicalist charges are being used against the active strike leaders.” But in the face of the growing mobilization of the working class, the bourgeoisie would have had to use even more force than they had before, entailing a significant risk. For example, if they had tried to use troops in Flint to evict the workers from the plants, they might have succeeded in breaking the strike, but they might just as
well have succeeded in setting off revolts and riots across the Midwestern industrial belt. There was a revolutionary potential implicit in the movement for the CIO. Was continuing violent suppression the answer? An important section of the bourgeoisie, represented in the
government by Roosevelt, thought not. And as the workers’ movement continued, this view became the prevailing view of the bourgeoisie. Certainly not all of the capitalists acquiesced in this position: witness the Little Steel holdout, or Ford’s rearguard action against the UAW, both as late as 1941. But the bourgeoisie, as a class, had taken a different position, and as U.S. entry into World War II approached, the bourgeois state moved to bring these recalcitrant capitalists in line.
If the bourgeoisie decided to accept the unions that had been created by the workers, it was in part because the bourgeoisie could see in these organizations the possibility for reining in the mobilization of the working class. But if the unions were to be used in this way, a bureaucracy must be reinforced or created within the workers’ own organizations. The bourgeoisie began to address the problem of how to take these new unions out of the hands of the workers who had created them.
Where it could, the bourgeoisie recognized an already existing bureaucracy – such as the AFL bureaucrats who founded the original Committee on Industrial Organization, or for example those officials of the mineworkers who constituted themselves as the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. Where this was not possible, such as with those unions which had been more popularly organized, the bourgeoisie sought to bypass the workers when it sat down to talk. So it was with Lewis that the heads of GM concluded the talks brining the Flint Sit-Down to an end.
As early as the first contracts, the companies agreed to pay this bureaucracy directly, by paying for its officials in the workplaces. The companies even went so far, starting in 1941, as to collect the workers’ dues money for the union apparatus, to assure this apparatus’s functioning independent of the workers.
An entire layer was created, made up of sometimes hundreds of workers within a single plant, and tens of thousands of workers within the working class, which began to separate itself out of the working class. To be paid to be a union official, to meet with the company and represent the workers was in many ways a privilege. Even if the union representatives were not paid any more than the other workers, although usually they were, their job was different and they had a more desirable status. Their interests became tied with their positions, to keep their positions, and to make their jobs more secure and desirable. To keep its privileges, this bureaucracy became dependent on and therefore tied to the bourgeoisie. Over the years, this union apparatus has been able to take itself out from under the control of the workers. Today union officials are either appointed from the bureaucracy or they are elected for fixed terms,
during which time it is virtually impossible for the workers to remove them.
The symbol of this bureaucracy has been of course its upper layers, which do not live as
as workers at all, but like upper layers of the professions or like the lower levels of the bourgeoisie itself. It has been able to do this because of its high income. Today, 14 top union leaders earn more than 100,000 dollars a year in salary and allowances, with the top salary going to Roy Williams of the Teamsters who gets $225, 000 a year, plus expense money which more than doubles his income. Even in the good old days of the union movement, its most important leader, John L. Lewis, was chauffeured in a Cadillac and lived like a country squire.
These union bureaucrats are integrated into the social life of the bourgeoisie. Lane Kirkland is good friends with Irving R. Shapiro, the former chairman of Du Pont, despite the fact that Du Pont is fighting union organizing drives in 15 of its plants. How often doesn’t Doug Fraser appear with Henry Ford or Lee Iacocca or the Fishers at social events in Detroit.
Most important, these union bureaucrats are integrated into the bourgeoisie’s state apparatus, both formally and informally. While it may have been shocking to some that Doug Fraser received a seat on Chrysler’s Board of Directors, for many years the top union officials have sat on many government boards. The mark of their integration is the fact that they sit in the chambers of the politicians when decisions are made.
Certainly to justify itself to the working class, this bureaucracy must produce at least part of what the workers wanted. And it did. The union bureaucracy was able to take credit for a certain number of gains which were the result of other factors. For example, over a period of years starting in the late 1930s, the workers’ standard of living rose, and the standard of living for unionized workers rose even more. This was true as far as wages were concerned and also for such protections as health insurance, pensions, vacations, and sick pay. Besides this, the union bureaucracy took credit for social legislation that again spelled gains for the working class, including social security, unemployment insurance, and the minimum wage. Even if these gains were not all that the bureaucrats claimed for them, they were in some ways substantial gains.
Of course, these concessions were made first of all because the American bourgeoisie could well afford to make them, and second because the workers fought for them. Even before World War II, U.S. imperialism was the strongest economic power in the world. It had already expanded its investments into South America, Europe, and Asia. But after World War II, its position was pre-eminent. U.S. imperialism emerged from the war, not merely the strongest power, but the dominant power in the world economy. The wealth it stole from the peoples around the world gave it the possibility easily to give some concessions to the American workers, if it felt the need to do so.
But these concessions were not given to the workers freely. They were won by the workers, and above all, because over a long period of time the working class had shown its
willingness to fight. (Need we add that the bourgeoisie today is taking back these concessions because the workers are not fighting?) Even though the bourgeoisie gave these concessions because of the workers’ mobilization, it gave them through negotiations with the bureaucrats. In this way, the bourgeoisie helped to reinforce the position of the bureaucrats within the unions. The crumbs from the banquet table of the bourgeoisie helped to give the union bureaucracy its much needed influence over the workers.
It was this bureaucracy which substituted itself for the workers’ own independent activity, in the process integrating the unions into the bourgeois state apparatus.
From the beginning, the bureaucracy tried to convince the workers to look to that state as the guarantor of their organization, to look to Section 7A and then to the Wagner Act as to what gave their unions legitimacy. It was implied in the organizing slogan of the UAW: “The President wants you to organize.”
It was implied in the resolution of the Ford conflict. After GM and Chrysler had accepted the union, it required 4 more years of struggle for the Ford workers – despite the existence of the Wagner Act. Their struggle culminated in a massive strike organized against the bureaucracy’s wishes. It was this strike, which shut down the Rouge (for the first time ever), that brought Ford to his knees. Yet, when the strike was triumphant, the bureaucracy agreed in the name of the workers to the proposal of the government to submit the matter of the union to an NLRB-conducted election. The election of course ratified what the strike had made obvious: the Ford workers had a union. But this resort to the NLRB gave the workers the illusion that the help of the state was necessary.
The Wagner Act was the first important legal expression of the fiction that the state is a neutral arbiter between the competing, but supposedly not hostile, claims of the workers and of the employers. Following Wagner was all the subsequent legislation which gave to the government the legal entitlement to intervene in and monitor the unions.
Again, from the beginning, it was the bureaucracy who proposed the contract as the goal to the workers. When the workers demanded that the capitalists recognize their union, the bureaucrats proposed to sign a contract with the bourgeoisie, incorporating not only union recognition, but also obligations. The company had obligations binding on the company, in terms of pay, benefits, working conditions, job classifications, and union representation. These were the sweeteners to get the workers to impose upon themselves certain obligations: above all, to accept the company’s right to direct the business solely as it sees fit. If the company did not meet its obligations, the workers had recourse only to the increasingly lengthy grievance procedure. In some very limited cases this grievance procedure contained the right to strike, but
in such a carefully regulated way, that for all practical purposes, the workers had no recourse to any weapon during the course of the contract – if they accepted what they agreed to in the
It is obvious today that the grievance procedure limits almost completely the workers’ freedom of action, and substitutes a union apparatus that is to act for them. Almost as soon as the struggles of the working class built the unions, the desire of the working class to continue struggling was channeled into a more or less regulated steam-letting process. The contracts established a pattern for strikes, allowed only at ceratin biennial or triennial periods.
In the decades following, although the number of strikes actually increased, they did not threaten the bourgeoisie in the same way. Either the strikes were channeled into the legal procedures or the bureaucracy was used to break the wildcat strikes. The one exception to this came during the strike wave of 1946, but by that time the bureaucracy was strongly enough installed in the major unions so that it was relatively simple for it to purge the unions of militants during the subsequent McCarthy witch-hunt. Of course, the bureaucracy was aided in this witch-hunt by the massive intervention of the state in all aspects of life during these years.
Certainly strikes are sometimes disruptive to the bourgeoisie, but all in all, the activity of the working class has been well-integrated into the orderly functioning of the economy. The bourgeoisie had bought itself the kind of labor peace it wanted to carry on its affairs.
Not only had the bourgeoisie found labor peace. It had also found in the union apparatus a supporter for its policies during political and economic crisis. It was the bureaucracy which systematically defended the policy of the bourgeoisie within the working class.
When the American bourgeoisie went to war, or rather sent the workers to battle to defend the bourgeoisie’s interests, it was the union apparatus which convinced the workers to continue to follow the bourgeoisie’s orders. Immediately after Roosevelt let the U.S. into World War II, the leaders of the CIO not only pledged their support for the war, but they also pledged their willingness to impose economic sacrifices on the workers for the war effort. This included the acceptance of both a wage freeze and a no-strike pledge. In order to aid U.S. imperialism to fight for control of the world, the union bureaucracy enthusiastically agreed to police the working class. The role it played in World War II, in and of itself, more than justified the recognition the bourgeoisie had given to this bureaucracy during the 1930s.
After World War II, came the Cold War, the Korean War, the Viet Nam War, and a host of “small actions.” In each case, the bureaucracy took the position that what was good for U.S. imperialism was good for the working class. Only very late in the Viet Nam War, when sections
of the bourgeoisie itself had begun to question the wisdom of that war, did any section of the bureaucracy oppose the war.
What was true abroad was just as true domestically, as far as the policies of the bourgeoisie was concerned. During the struggles of black people in this country, when a section of the working class was fighting against the discrimination and violence it faced, what did the union bureaucracy do? With minor exceptions, nothing. One section stayed on the sidelines and did nothing to support the black movement, outside of a few words of encouragement. The other section of the bureaucracy fought actively against the black movement.
Today, the bourgeoisie has a severe economic crisis on its hands. To protect its profits, the bourgeoisie has called on the working class to make the necessary sacrifices. The working class has already taken the brunt of the chronic inflation and the unemployment without the unions responding. Now in industry after industry the bourgeoisie is forcing through cuts and removing even the protections the working class had won in the past. It is using the bureaucracy to force though these cuts, to act as its cop in the working class, as it dismantles the several decades of gains the workers had won.
For the bourgeoisie, there is no question but that the bureaucracy will toe the line. It must enforce the cuts on the workers. If a bureaucracy balks at this command, the bourgeoisie threatens to carry out a war against it. This was illustrated by the PATCO strike. The leadership of PATCO had originally opposed the strike and delayed it for 2 months, giving the government time to prepare. Yet finally, the leadership of PATCO went along with the determination of the controllers to fight. For the government, even this was intolerable. Today it is out to break PATCO, and make an example to the other bureaucracies of what happens if a union decides to disobey the government in these times.
What has happened so far in the PATCO strike is an example of where the policy of the bureaucracies has led the workers. When the workers accept the fiction that they can have a union only when the government extends its recognition, the workers morally give a weapon to the government. When the government wants to discipline a section of the working class, it can withhold its recognition, or withdraw its recognition from their union.
During the good times, the union bureaucracy was able to play a double role. It had to discipline the working class, but at the same time it was allowed to dole out a few crumbs, and even substantial sized ones. But today, in the current economic crisis, the bureaucracy has only one role in society. It serves as a police force for the bourgeoisie.
Today, if the working class does not want to be more and more exploited, eventually losing all that it has won in the past through its struggle, it must prepare itself to fight. It will
have to create an organization, ready to intervene not only on the economic level, but also on the political level.
Will that organization be the old unions? Will it be new unions which the working class builds to replace the old ones, just as the workers of the 1930s replaced the AFL with the CIO? Will it be an organization different from the unions? It could be within any of these frameworks that the working class could fight, but one thing is constant: in order to fight, the working class will have to oppose this current bureaucracy and get rid of it.
And if it doesn’t want to repeat the experience of the CIO, to build an organization, only to have it taken over by a bureaucracy, the working class will have to keep itself organized. More important, the working class will have to have a different goal this time: not to compromise with the old society, but to destroy it and replace it with a society that the working class creates. That is, finally, the working class must do something other than just build a union.