the Voice of
The Communist League of Revolutionary Workers–Internationalist
“The emancipation of the working class will only be achieved by the working class itself.”
— Karl Marx
Oct 21, 2012
On October 23rd, 2012, it was exactly one year since Libya was officially declared “free” by the governments of the imperialist powers, after seven months of “humanitarian” carpet bombing, which they carried out under the official pretext of protecting the Libyan population from Qaddafi’s guns.
However, if not for the inconvenient death, right in the middle of the American presidential campaign, of the U.S. ambassador in Libya and three of his diplomatic staff, killed by gunmen in Benghazi on September 11th, 2012, Libya’s dire situation might have been left under the carpet where it was swept many months ago.
Apparently the Obama administration had at first hoped this killing could be explained away as the collateral damage of a wave of protests taking place at the time throughout the Middle-East and beyond, following the release of a video made in the U.S. accused of “insulting Islam.”
But eventually the State Department had to admit that the diplomats had obviously been killed as a result of well-organized rocket attacks on two U.S. facilities in Benghazi. This action was not that of a fanatical mob gone mad. It was a serious military operation against a Western power, which had been planned in advance to coincide with the anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. And it took place in a country whose population was supposedly eternally grateful to the U.S. for its help in overthrowing Qaddafi’s dictatorship!
While U.S. politicians of all shades were bickering over the lack of protection given to diplomatic personnel, what these developments really exposed, once again, was the myth of the West’s “humanitarian” intervention in Libya. Just as in Iraq and Afghanistan, “regime change” in Libya was carried out by Western bombs—the main difference being that, this time, it was done at a minimal political, material and human cost for the imperialist powers. But just as in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Pandora’s box was opened in the process. The brutal rule of the previous dictator was replaced by the no less brutal rule of rival militias vying for power. Meanwhile, the Libyan population, which the West’s “humanitarian” intervention was supposed to protect, is once again at the receiving end of this brutality.
On this subject, we reprint here large extracts of an article published by the British comrades of Workers Fight (Class Struggle #97, October 2012).
On October 23rd, 2011, when Libya was officially declared “free,” following Qaddafi’s execution and the fall of the last strongholds of his regime, there were celebrations in Western capitals. For once, it seemed that a Western military intervention had gone according to plan without causing a backlash. In the U.S., a former staff member of the State Department from the Bush era even praised Obama in the coded jargon of U.S. diplomacy by writing that “Libya had demonstrated the viability of a well-implemented Responsibility-to-Protect intervention.”
Yet, within weeks of this “victory for democracy,” another kind of “demonstration” could be seen in Libya. Demonstrations were taking place in the streets of Tripoli on an almost daily basis, to protest the brutality of the brigades of “thuwwars” (revolutionaries) then roaming the streets of the main towns in heavily-armed pick-ups, imposing their rule on people under the pretext of hunting down “Qaddafi loyalists,” while waging a bloody turf war among themselves. Instead of the idyllic “democracy” hailed by Western governments, bloody chaos was emerging out of the ashes of Qaddafi’s regime.
Obviously, this was not what the Western powers had hoped for. Democratic freedoms for the Libyan population were never really on their agenda, neither during Qaddafi’s long rule, nor after the West’s military intervention. But the one thing they wanted to avoid was a power vacuum and the political chaos that would inevitably follow, after the collapse of Qaddafi’s regime, as had happened in Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
In this respect the imperialist powers were confronted with a major problem: they had no insiders, nor influence, among the ruling circles of Qaddafi’s repressive apparatus. So they could not rely on the Libyan army to push the dictator out while keeping everything else under control, which is the pattern followed in some of the other countries affected by the so-called “Arab Spring,” such as Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen. Overthrowing Qaddafi could only be achieved through the disintegration of this army and, in order to fill the vacuum, some sort of embryonic state machinery “in waiting” had to be built.
This purpose was assigned to the National Transitional Council (NTC), which was set up in Benghazi on February 27th 2011, and immediately recognized by the main Western powers. While the majority of its members were unknown characters—except maybe to Western secret services, if they had lived in exile for decades—the NTC leadership was a known quantity. Its chief was one of Qaddafi’s former Justice ministers, Mustafa Abdul Jalil. It included an ex-Interior minister, General Abdul Fatah Younis—who was to head the new Libyan army—and also a former head of the regime’s National Economic Development Board, Mahmoud Jibril. These high-ranking individuals from Qaddafi’s ruling circles were expected to encourage leading figures of the regime to defect. Western governments spared no effort in trying to entice regime dignitaries—especially Libyan diplomats—to side with the NTC. At the same time the Western bombing campaign was meant, among other things, to convince Qaddafi’s officers that they were on the losing side, and that they would have everything to gain by defecting with their men and weapons before it was too late.
However, this strategy did not prove as successful as was hoped, at least not in the army. While a few army units switched sides, together with their officers and heavy weaponry, they were mostly from Cyrenaica, the eastern province around Benghazi. But in most units, especially in Qaddafi’s strongholds around Tripoli and Sirte, the officer caste remained behind the regime, and the soldiers who joined the rebels did so in relatively small, isolated groups, taking with them their own weapons, but no heavy equipment. Instead of providing the NTC with a solid, ready-made skeleton for its future army, most of these soldiers returned individually to their native towns, where they either returned to civilian life or joined the local militias that had began to emerge.
Most of these militias were formed in the name of defending one town, or sometimes just one urban district. Others were organized by businessmen who were rich enough to buy the required weapons and provisions for the militiamen—who were then used primarily as the businessmen’s own private armies.
Other militias were set up by political currents pursuing their own objectives. Among these currents were different brands of provincial and ethnic separatists, from the eastern province of Cyrenaica and the southern province of Fezzan, in particular. But probably the most active of these currents came out of splinter groups originating from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), a Salafist armed organization set up in 1990 by returnees from the “jihad” against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The LIFG had been brutally repressed by Qaddafi in the 1990s and the organization had been effectively destroyed. But it had survived in the form of a number of more or less rival small groups, which all claimed the heritage of the LIFG for themselves as well as its martyrs, whether underground in Libya itself or in exile.
In any case, these militias had their own priorities, which did not always coincide with the NTC’s agenda, nor even with the requirements of the war against Qaddafi’s forces. In particular, right from their inception, political and local rivalries—when they were not personal rivalries—often made co-operation between these militias quite complicated, if not totally impossible.
Whether the NTC command was able to use these militias effectively in combat depended entirely on the goodwill of their self-proclaimed commanders. And few of them took orders without question. The resulting chaos among the rebel forces accounted for much of their slow progress against the regime, despite the Western bombing of Qaddafi’s forces and positions.
When the dictatorship finally collapsed, more due to Western bombs than to the fighting capacity of the rebels, these militias were suddenly promoted to the status of “heroes of the revolution.” Taking advantage of the disarray prevailing among the remains of the former regime’s police and army, they took over the existing stocks of weapons and used these weapons to occupy official buildings and impose their own appointees to official positions. This was seldom a smooth process as, especially in the largest cities, several rival militias were vying for the role of top dog. The results were numerous armed confrontations in the street.
At the same time the checkpoints manned by the militias and their arbitrary arrests of alleged “pro-Qaddafi suspects,” whose main purpose seemed to be to extract heavy ransom, called “fines,” from the relatives of arrested “suspects,” became part of the day-to-day life of the population. There were more and more reports of beatings and torture inflicted on “suspects.” Many people “disappeared” after being arrested, either because they were killed after failing to pay the required “fine” or because they were kept in one of the clandestine jails that the largest militias have established—in January 2012, the U.N. estimated that the militias illegally held 7,000 detainees in their prisons.
The downfall of Qaddafi’s regime did not stop the development of the militias. On the contrary, they experienced a meteoric growth. By June 2012, it was estimated that 400 different militias existed across the country, probably five times more than in October 2011. A number of these, of course, had been formed by traffickers, smugglers and gangsters of all kinds, for whom a militia was merely a convenient way of concealing criminal activities.
Moreover, in a country whose economy had come to a virtual standstill and where over one third of the population of working age had no source of income, membership in a militia provided both social status and a source of income, though only a modest one. This was even more the case when, by April 2012, the NTC announced a scheme involving the payment of a one-time bonus for all “thuwwars.” Predictably, the scheme attracted around 10 times as many applications as the estimated number of “thuwwars” involved in the civil war. But all applications had to be sponsored by one recognized militia or another—a new way for them to boost their recruitment.
In short, no sooner had the dust of the so-called “revolution” against Qaddafi settled, than the chaos of the militias’ rule settled in, leading to many protests over the following months, similar to those already mentioned in Tripoli.
The NTC’s Western advisers were determined to avoid a repetition of one of the catastrophic mistakes made in Iraq: the “de-Baathification” of the army and police, which had paralyzed the repressive machinery of the Iraqi state, while pushing tens of thousands of its members into the arms of the forces fighting the Western occupation. Of course, there was no occupation in Libya. But there was still the risk of an armed opposition to the NTC emerging out of the remnants of the defunct regime’s state machinery. So, the Western governments urged the NTC to maintain the role and apparatus of Qaddafi’s police and army, without too many questions asked, while the militias were to be progressively integrated into their ranks.
This was easier said than done. As a result of the Western bombing campaign, many army units had disintegrated. The units still intact by the end of the campaign had dispersed after the regime’s collapse for fear of retribution, and so had a large part of Qaddafi’s police and special forces. More importantly, the main militias, many of which could now line up dozens of tanks and other heavy weaponry, were determined to have a decisive political role of their own in the new Libya.
Besides, it was out of the question for the militias to agree to operate under the authority of former senior officials from Qaddafi’s regime. The murder of the NTC’s defense minister, Qaddafi’s ex-Interior minister Younis, in July 2011 (probably by members of an Islamic militia, although they never admitted responsibility), and the subsequent protracted process of finding a replacement for his post who could suit the militia, had already shown the extent to which the militias were prepared to go in order to retain their autonomy and to impose their will on the new regime.
So, the NTC changed tack. Instead of integrating the militias into a new army with an appointed officer staff, the NTC sub-contracted military tasks to the militias—turning them into the de facto army of the regime—and then tried to appoint former high-ranking officers, first as advisers to these militias and, much later on, as commanding officers.
At the end of 2011, the NTC set up a new body called the Supreme Security Committee (SSC), which was supposed to coordinate policing tasks across the country, under the control of the Ministry of the Interior. In reality, the SSC was a patchwork of militias—some of which were just local armed groups, while others were large groups with a political agenda—to whom policing work was to be subcontracted. In return for maintaining order around the country on behalf of the NTC, these militias could rest on its authority, and they were given funds to pay their fighters a salary slightly higher than the average wage. This incentive was designed to encourage militias to work for the government rather than remain independent.
Likewise, military tasks, especially in the hinterland and along the country’s borders, were sub-contracted some time later to two groupings of militias, both operating under the control of the Ministry of Defense. The largest of the two, the “Libyan Shield,” which comprised seven militias, included the main armed groups from the towns of Misrata and Zintan, in the Tripoli province. In reality, this move merely institutionalized the state of affairs left by the collapse of the Qaddafi regime. According to a study published last June, the Misrata militia on its own controlled more than half of the country’s heavy weapons, including 820 tanks. The NTC was incapable of regaining control of these heavy weapons from the militias which held them, so it simply declared that the militias would form its official army!
This sub-contracting of police and military tasks has resulted in an endless series of intractable—and often bloody—conflicts, which continue today. It is one thing to give a mission to militia commanders and it is quite another to get them to carry it out. Sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t. But even when they do intervene as requested, it may be in a way which is very different from what was intended.
One example among many others is provided by the repeated interventions of the Libyan Shield around Sabha, in southern Libya, where it was meant to stop an on-going turf war waged by local Arab militias against the Toubous, a black African ethnic group split among Libya, Chad, Niger and Sudan. In several towns the Toubous were forced to flee by the Arab militias. But each time, when the Libyan Shield was requested to intervene and provide protection to the Toubous, its militias took the side of their aggressors.
These militias often ignore the orders they receive. For a long time, for instance, Tripoli’s international airport was officially controlled by the Zintan militia belonging to the Libyan Shield, which used it as a launching pad for its own activities—controlling passports and filtering visitors according to its own criteria and, above all, raising its own duties on certain imported goods. After months of painstaking negotiations and several failed deals, the NTC finally got the Zintan militia to withdraw. On paper, the old Libyan airport police were supposed to take over from there. In reality, as Libyan airport officials recalled later, the militia men just changed their uniforms, re-painted their cars in the official red and white and remained in control of the airport! And no one could dislodge them.
What is true for the Libyan Shield is just as true for the SSC. Several of its components are Islamic militias led by former cadres of the LIFG who are pursuing their own political agenda independently from the orders they are supposed to follow. In May 2012, for instance, one of these militias kidnapped and tortured a prominent Ministry of Health official with whom it was in dispute, ignoring direct orders from the Ministry of Interior to release him and pleas from the Health ministry. In September 2012, SSC militias intervened in a series of attacks staged by Salafist groups against Sufi shrines and mosques in central Tripoli. These militias did not intervene to protect the shrines, but, rather, to protect the attackers while they were bulldozing the shrines and beating up Sufi protesters.
In general, whether they are part of the bodies officially put in place by the NTC or not, the militias have been particularly prominent in hunting down hundreds of thousands of foreign workers who had remained in Libya after the end of the war. The militias have closed down refugee camps for displaced foreigners, set up by charitable organizations. Many of these foreigners have been arrested, jailed and tortured, as supposed Qaddafi supporters. This on-going manhunt has never stopped. On October 21st, 2012, Egyptian families who had settled many years ago in Bani Walid, a town located 115 miles southeast of Tripoli, were forced at gunpoint by local militias to leave their houses and flee toward the capital.
Over the past year, an endless series of terrorist attacks have taken place in the main Libyan towns. They may have been attributed to Qaddafi loyalists or to Al-Qaeda by the NTC, but every Libyan knows that the attacks are being carried out by these same militias—including those that have the NTC’s official recognition. Whether their targets are foreigners and foreign dignitaries, or whether they are official buildings and NTC appointees, these attacks all have the same objective: to maintain a climate of terror among the population that justifies the need for the militias and their guns to remain on the streets, to “protect the revolution” from its enemies, whoever they may be.
That the NTC did not have the resources to counter easily the rising power of the militias is probably true. But it did not have the political will either.
A significant number of NTC members are Islamic fundamentalists or members of the Muslim Brotherhood, with personal or political links to one or another of the main militias. Leading figures of the Ministry of the Interior appointed by the NTC to control the SSC were known to have Islamic sympathies. If the NTC never challenged the Islamic militias, which carried out the most vicious attacks on the population, it was not just because it did not dare to do so, but also because, for many NTC members, these militias were their political instrument of choice.
The NTC repeatedly went through the motions of ordering the militias to relinquish their weapons and even of banning them altogether. But those were only symbolic gestures. Deadlines were announced and passed without anything ever happening. The Libyan population remained in a precarious situation, with the militias on the streets, their in-fighting continuing. For weeks and even months the NTC said nothing. This stance only would have quickly discredited the NTC. But it also lacked credit due to its chronic corruption and incompetence.
At the end of 2011 for instance, the NTC announced that its 2012 budget would involve 53 billion dollars worth of expenditure. This was meant to involve a scheme designed to provide medical treatment for those injured during the war, training and job opportunities for young “thuwwars” and a vast program of essential rebuilding. None of that happened.
Instead, by August 2012, most of the budget remained unspent. Public sector wages and pensions had been substantially increased on paper, but they had not been paid for months. New jobs had been created and employees hired, but they had neither work nor pay. The essential rebuilding work announced never materialized. As to the Qaddafi-era housing projects—those not hit by Western bombs were now falling into disrepair because the foreign contractors who had started working on them were refusing to return to a country “run by shadowy gunmen,” as the Financial Times correspondent put it.
The NTC kept boasting, together with the Western media, that oil production was returning to its pre-war level. Officially, by August, government oil revenue had reached five billion dollars per month. But it seemed as if that flow of cash was blocked in some bureaucratic pipeline—or, maybe, as a growing number of Libyans suspected, it was channeled into the politicians’ own pockets. In any case, it was nowhere to be seen, and discontent kept growing.
In 2011, elections had been announced to replace the self-appointed NTC. They were planned for June 2012. In the end, the elections had to be held in July, due to the huge number of candidates (3,700 actually stood) and the large number who were disqualified because of their links with Qaddifi’s regime.
The country was divided into 73 constituencies represented by a total of 120 deputies, who were supposed to stand as individuals without any party affiliation. In addition, there were 80 seats allocated to registered political parties, which were to be filled in proportion to the votes scored by the national lists presented by the parties.
The results went against all expectations. Opinion polls and political commentators had predicted a clear win for the Justice and Construction Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, which appeared to be the best organized, the most visible and the largest party in the country. But in fact, the clear winner was the National Forces Alliance (NFA), a coalition led by the former head of Qaddafi’s National Economic Development Board, Mahmoud Jibril. The NFA appeared as being the party least focused on religion. By contrast, while the Muslim Brotherhood came second, but well behind the winner, none of the other parties managed to win more than three seats—especially not the three Islamic fundamentalist parties which won only one seat each.
Drawing conclusions from this result is obviously difficult from a distance and without knowing enough about what voters actually expected from it. But the results seemed to express the exasperation of an electorate in the face of a drastic deterioration in their situation and their desire to see a return, not to Qaddafi’s regime, of course, but to some sort of normality, in the economy and in the streets.
The new General National Congress (GNC) was clearly not going to act quickly. It elected and fired one prime minister whom the deputies eventually found to be too close to the Islamic parties for their liking. On October 14, 2012, the GNC finally elected a new prime minister, Ali Zidan—a human rights lawyer who was elected as an independent and who is considered to be a “secular liberal.” But Zidan still has to get the GNC to endorse his government, which was not a done deal.
The GNC is taking a long time to get its act together, thanks to the rule of the militias, or rather the underlying centrifugal forces which many of them have been whipping up in order to boost their influence.
Right from the very early days of the uprising against Qaddafi, demands for regional autonomy, or even independence, featured high on the agenda of the protesters and, subsequently, the insurgents. This was particularly true in the original stronghold of the uprising, Cyrenaica, the region around Benghazi, where protesters claimed to have been discriminated against for far too long under Qaddafi.
Since the fall of Qaddafi, demands for regional autonomy, federalism and regional independence have gained even more importance. The election to the GNC was another opportunity for these demands to be raised, despite all the precautions taken in the distribution of the seats to guarantee a more or less proportional representation to each of the country’s three provinces and its various districts.
So, in March 2012, four months before the election of the GNC, militia commanders from Cyrenaica, who were unhappy with the 60 seats allocated to the province in the GNC (as opposed to 100 for Tripoli province and 40 for the southern province, Fezzan), joined forces to declare a semi-autonomous region, which they called Barqa (the Arabic name of the province). Two months later, in May 2012, in the run-up to the GNC election, the militia affiliated to the resulting self-proclaimed Barqa Transitional Council blocked the Tripoli-Benghazi road to all military and commercial traffic to support their autonomist demand.
Cyrenaica has long been a hotbed of separatism—going way back in Libya’s history. But it was not the same in many smaller regions, or even towns, where the local ruling militias are institutionalizing the powers they have won for themselves by raising demands for autonomy or, at least, for more representation in the GNC.
For instance, on October 4, 2012, armed demonstrators from the western town of Zawiyah (30 miles west of Tripoli) stormed a GNC meeting and occupied the building in protest against what they considered as inadequate representation of their town. Potentially more ominous was a report by a journalist from The Guardian, in June 2012, about the huge placards at the entrance of the western port town of Misrata which read “Welcome to the Republic of Misrata.” This was more than just a symbol. Located on Misrata’s territory is Qasr Ahmed, Libya’s largest container harbor. Since the militias have taken over control of Misrata, this harbor has been run as an autonomous entity, without paying a penny of its income to the central government!
In southern Libya, a militia aiming at defending the specific interests of the Toubou population was formed during the uprising against Qaddafi: the Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL). The Toubous had been deprived of their Libyan citizenship by Qaddafi in 2008, and they were the targets of ethnic cleansing attempts by local Arab strong men. A similar situation has developed around the western town of Zuwara, whose predominantly ethnic Berber population is constantly under attack from neighboring Arab militias. These militias may have justified their existence by pretending to defend the different ethnic groups from attacks, but their ambition was to impose their own rule.
Not only are centrifugal forces at work in Libya itself, which, given the rivalries between the militias, could tear the country apart, but some of these centrifugal forces are also directly affecting neighboring countries.
In fact, the Libyan civil war has already had catastrophic consequences for many of its neighbors, especially on its southern border. U.N. figures show that an estimated 420,000 people have fled from Libya to Sub-Saharan Africa since the beginning of 2011—200,000 to Niger, 150,000 to Chad, 30,000 to Mali and 40,000 to Mauritania—resulting in additional strain on these countries and an increase in trafficking and smuggling across the borders.
But in addition, the massive quantities of weapons that have become available in Libya, both those supplied by NATO and by Middle-East allies during the war and those released by the collapse of Qaddafi’s army, have boosted enormously the arsenal of militias operating in neighboring countries. In northern Mali, in particular, the local Islamic fundamentalist militias, linked to similar militias in Libya, have been able to raise their profile and wreak havoc, thanks to this new source of weapons. In Syria too, although not a neighbor of Libya, Islamic militias armed and trained in Libya are currently taking part in the civil war against the Assad regime.
No one knows how far the chaos unleashed in Libya, with the assistance of the imperialist bombs, will spread in the region nor what long-term consequences it will have in Libya. There is, at least, one element of optimism in Libya: the reaction of the population of Benghazi against the latest wave of terrorist attacks in their town in September 2012. On September 21st, thousands of protesters stormed the barracks of two of the most notorious Islamic militias and drove them out of Benghazi. This may be a starting point. But it will certainly take a lot more than such protests to rid Libya of the dictatorship of the militias—a far deeper and more radical mobilization of the masses against these armed gangs, the politicians who use their services, and this exploitative system which provides a fertile ground for such poisonous outgrowths.